From NBER

"Countries with successful stock markets mandate that shareholders receive the information they need and the power to act - including both voting and litigation - on this information? The empirical results further suggest that an effective strategy of regulating large self-dealing transactions is to combine full disclosure of such transactions with the requirement of approval by disinterested shareholders."

Investor expropriation -- also known as self-dealing or tunneling -- takes such forms as excessive executive compensation and perquisites, transfer pricing, insider trading, self-serving transactions, and outright theft. In The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing (NBER Working Paper No. 11883) by Simeon Djankov, Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, the focus is on the kinds of cases in which controllers of companies make deals that may benefit them at the expense of other investors, but in which -- unlike in the Enron and Parmalat scandals -- the controllers observe the laws regarding disclosure and approval procedures. One of the primary questions the researchers ask is: if a controlling shareholder wants to enrich himself without breaking the law, how difficult is it for minority shareholders either to thwart the deal or, if it is carried out, to recover damages?

In order to determine which nations best protect minority shareholders from such abuses - and to ascertain how those protections affect a nation's financial development - the researchers create a hypothetical scenario in which a corporate officer who owns large portions of two companies engages in a self-dealing sales transaction between the firms that benefits the officer via an inflated payment. They presented this scenario to members of Lex Mundi, an association of international law firms that operates in 108 countries. The lawyers were asked to describe the legal barriers in their countries to getting away with such a transaction.

Lawyers from 102 countries provided complete answers to the researchers' questionnaire. The researchers conducted follow-up inquiries, and the sample they used for this paper was based on the responses of 72 lawyers who confirmed the validity of the aggregate data.

The lawyers were asked to describe the minimum legal requirements in force in May 2003 regarding who approves a transaction such as described in the hypothetical scenario; what needs to be disclosed to the board of directors, the stock exchange, and the regulators; the duties of corporate officers, directors, and controlling shareholders; how the transaction's validity could be challenged; what plaintiffs would need to prove to recover damages; access to information; fines and other penalties, and the like. Based on the data, the authors reached several conclusions. Primary among these is that the index for minority shareholder protection is sharply higher in common law countries, such as the United Kingdom (which ranks fifth on the anti-self-dealing index), than in civil law countries, such as Italy (forty-second on the index). This is consistent with earlier studies that concluded that investor protection is higher in common law countries than in civil law ones.

The researchers also were interested in how the regulation of self-dealing might relate to the development of a nation's stock market. It was also clear that the index is a statistically significant and economically strong predictor of a variety of measures of stock market development across countries. Foremost among these measures is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. The index results support earlier findings that demonstrated that common law countries have much more valuable stock markets relative to their GDPs than do civil law countries. The results also show that theoretical measures of investor protection are closely linked to financial development.

The researchers could not isolate a single "best" measure of shareholder protection, but concluded that measures of shareholder protection from securities laws appear to work best in terms of predicting stock market outcomes; the data for this, however, was available for only 49 countries. These measures moreover are particularly appropriate for studies of protection of investors buying securities, as opposed to corporate governance per se.

The researchers say that perhaps the most basic conclusion from their data is that laissez-faire - having no public regulation or oversight at all - is certainly not conducive to developing financial markets. Countries with successful stock markets mandate that shareholders receive the information they need and the power to act - including both voting and litigation - on this information.

The empirical results further suggest that an effective strategy of regulating large self-dealing transactions is to combine full disclosure of such transactions with the requirement of approval by disinterested shareholders. Similarly, the results suggest that ongoing disclosure of self-dealing transactions, combined with a relatively easy burden of litigation placed on the aggrieved shareholders, also benefits stock market development.

Finally, the evidence suggests that the government's power to impose fines and imprisonment for self-dealing transactions that meet disclosure and approval requirements does not benefit stock market development. The authors stress that this is a narrow conclusion, since it does not address the importance of public enforcement in situations where self-dealing transactions are concealed, as in the cases of Enron and Parmalat. To avoid self-dealing, however, it appears best to rely on extensive disclosure, approval by disinterested shareholders and private enforcement.

对Peter, Drucker管理思想的总结：

What do I consider my most important Contributions?

-That I early on —almost sixty years ago —realized that MANAGEMENT has become the constitutive organ and function of the Society of Organization;

-That MANAGEMENT is not “Business Management”—though it first attained attention in business —but the governing organ of All institutions of Modern Society;

-That I established the study of MANAGEMENT as a DISCIPLINE in its own right;

                                and

-That I focused this discipline on People and Power ;on Values; Structure and Constitution ;AND ON RESPONSIBILITIES—that is focused the Discipline of Management on Management as a truly LIBERAL ART.

                                                 Peter, Drucker

                                              January 18.1999

    1954年11月6日是管理学中一个划时代的日子，Peter, Drucker在这一天出版了他的《管理的实践》一书。该书的出版标志着管理学作为一门科学的诞生。MANAGEMENT一词是由Peter, Drucker发明的。

    Peter, Drucker曾指出：“管理是一种器官，是赋予机构以生命、能动、动态的器官。没有机构（如工商企业），就不会有管理。但是，如果没有管理，那也就只会有一群乌合之众，而不会有机构。而机构本身又是社会的一个器官，它之所以存在，只是为了给社会、经济和个人提供所需的成果。”

    Peter, Drucker精辟地阐述了管理的本质：“管理是一种实践，其本质不在于知，而在于行；其验证不在于逻辑，而在于成果；其惟一权威是成就。”

    2004年10月1 日，Peter, Drucker在美国Drucker档案馆举办的“智者对话”上，精辟地阐述了21世纪CEO的责任，他又一次也是最后一次面对众多高管人员再一次强调了管理者的责任。他讲到：“首先要说的是。CEO要承担责任，而不是享有‘权力’。你不能用工作所具有的权力来界定工作，而只能用你对这项工作所产生的结果来界定。CEO要对组织的使命和行动以及价值观和结果负责。最重要的就是结果。有鉴于此，CEO的工作因他们所服务的组织不同而有所不同。”

     自《管理的实践》问世近半个世纪以来，Drucker通过著书立说、讲学、提建议等方法，不厌其烦地提出：管理既要眼睛向外，关心它的使命及组织成果；又要眼睛朝内，注视那些能使个人取得成就的结构、价值观及人际关系。

     Drucker在《新现实》一书中清晰地解释了为什么称“管理”为一门“综合艺术”。他说：“管理被人们称为使一门综合艺术——‘综合’使因为管理涉及基本原理、自我认知、智慧和领导力；‘艺术’使因为管理是实践和应用。”

     《管理的实践》是“第一本”将管理视为整体的管理书籍。更具有创新意义的是，Drucker视社会和企业为有机体，因此，管理成为组织社会的基本器官，而器官只能按照其功能来定义。管理作为企业的具体器官，它具有以下三个功能：

一．             管理企业

企业的目的只有一个适当的定义：创造顾客。企业的两项职能：营销和创新。营销和创新产生经济成果，其余的一切都是“成本”

Drucker的三个经典问题：1.我们的事业是什么？2.我们的事业将是什么？3.我们的事业究竟应该是什么？

二．             管理管理者

Drucker创造性地提出“目标管理和自我控制”，他把这项管理原则视作“管理哲学”。

三．             管理员工和工作

在《管理的实践》的结语中，Drucker给我们带来了一缕思想的清风，他说：“公司不能自称（绝对不能自称）是员工的家、归宿、信仰、生命或命运。公司也不可以干预员工个人的私生活或者员工的公民权。将员工与公司连在一起的，只是一份自愿的、随时可以被取消的聘用合同，并不是一条神秘的、不可撤销的纽带。”正确地定位个人与组织的关系，可以为组织和个人减少许多不必要的烦恼。那么，个人与组织应当是一种什么样的关系呢？“组织需要个人为其做出所需的贡献；个人需要把组织当成实现自己人生目标的工具。” Drucker用清晰和简单的语言帮助我们理清了个人和组织的关系。

    Drucker总结他对思潮的贡献是：“我是第一位认清企业经营的目的不在企业本身，而是在企业外部——也就是创造与满足顾客——的人；第一位认清决策过程重要性的人；第一位认清组织架构应该追随策略的人。我也是第一位认清，或至少是首先指出，有效的管理必须通过目标管理和自我控制的人。”

管理的终极之善是改变他人的生活。

     可是没过多长时间，牧师的儿子就把地图拼成原来的样子了，牧师感到非常地奇怪，小孩子怎么会知道世界地图是什么样子的呢？于是，牧师就问他的儿子是怎么拼成功的，小孩说：“这些纸片的背面是一个人的画像，我按照人的画像拼就可以了。”这下，牧师才恍然大悟，是啊！人对了，这个世界不就也对了吗？于是牧师决定第二天的演讲词的题目定为：人对了，世界也就对了。牧师兑现了他的承诺，带儿子去公园痛痛快快地玩。

    是啊！人对了，世界也就对了。现代管理学的一个重要原理就是，以人为本。管理的对象是人，管理的目标是为了人，只有人的全面发展，这个社会才能说是全面进步；只有人的现代化，这个社会才能现代化。

    在我看来，人的现代化应该是：人可以享受物质文明、精神文明、政治文明的现代意义上的公民。遗憾的是，我所直接看到的世界并非如此，太多的类似“金喇叭”式的神话让我失去了往日的热情、曾经的顶礼膜拜。在通往理性的道路上，我变得有些悲观了，或者说是有点厌世了。

    寻找心中的上帝，让心灵不在孤单，在宇宙视野中定义人生，用一颗仁爱之心去看待这个世界吧！